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CASE SUMMARIES

counterclaim. They found that the studios did not refuse to deal
when they rejected PRE's offer of settlement, and this refusal to
settle afforded no basis for antitrust liability. The court held that
PRE failed to demonstrate any injury resulting from the alleged
antitrust activity, and that in order to waive Noerr-Pennington immunity, PRE had to show that the original lawsuit was legally
baseless before looking at any subjective intent to perpetuate anticompetitive conduct on the part of Columbia. The court went on
to find that Columbia's copyright suit, although unsuccessful, was
brought with probable cause, and that a suit brought with probable cause did not fall within the sham exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. Thus, the court found no need for further discovery on the part of PRE to determine the studios' subjective intent,
because the first prong of the immunity waiver test, involving
baseless claims, was not met. According to the court, PRE was not
prejudiced by bringing up the pendent state law claims in California state courts, because the state court tolls the statute of limitations period during the time a suit is pending in federal court.
Thus, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion, and its decision was affirmed in all aspects.
-C.L.

McNEIL v.

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE,
(D.MINN. 1992).

790 F. Supp. 871

Plaintiffs, eight professional football players whose National
Football League contracts expired, filed antitrust claims against
the National Football League (NFL) and the NFL team owners
under section I of the Sherman Act seeking an injunction to permanently bar the NFL and the NFL team owners from implementing certain proposals under "Plan B". In 1988, the NFL presented
to the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) a
proposal, entitled "Plan B", to enter a new system of player restraints. Under "Plan B", the NFL proposed, inter alia, to eliminate all contract negotiations with the individual football players
and establish a league-wide wage scale. By eliminating competition
among the different NFL teams, plaintiffs claim that the proposed
wage scale is violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Both parties
brought various motions before the district court.
First, the district court denied the players' motion for a permanent injunction based on testimony that the NFL, although already having implemented certain other proposals under "Plan B",
had no immediate intention of implementing the league-wide wage
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scale. In turn, however, the court declined to grant the NFL's motion for summary judgment on that claim because, if implemented,
the proposed wage scale would likely amount to a violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. Because the NFL had implemented most
of the other proposals included under "Plan B", the threat of future antitrust injury, although not sufficient for the court to grant
an injunction, was sufficient to defeat the NFL's motion for summary judgment.
Second, the NFL moved for summary judgment on all of the
players' claims, contending that (1) the NFL functions as a single
economic entity and, as such, they are incapable of conspiring
within the meaning of the Sherman Act, and (2) the antitrust laws
do not apply to restraints operating solely within an isolated labor
market. Because operating as a single economic entity does not exempt the NFL's agreement between its member teams from the
antitrust laws and because Supreme Court precedent has held that
antitrust laws do apply to restraints operating solely within an isolated labor market, the court dismissed the NFL's argument and
denied their motion.
Third, the NFL moved for partial summary judgment on the
players' claim for treble damages, arguing that such damages could
not be recovered for injury before the court renders a decision on
the viability of a particular claim. Thus, the NFL claimed the
plaintiffs could not recover damages from the date the injury occurred. The court dismissed the NFL's contention and held that
their antitrust liability accrued from the date the collective bargaining relationship between the NFL and the NFLPA ended.
Fourth, on the players' motion for partial summary judgment,
the NFL was estopped from relitigating the issues of (1) the existence of a relevant market for football players' services and (2) the
existence of the NFL's monopoly power in the relevant market for
football players. However, the NFL was not estopped from litigating the issue of the NFL's monopoly power in the relevant market
for football players' services.
Lastly, the players moved for partial summary judgment concerning the application of a per se rule of illegality to the first refusal and compensation rights under "Plan B". Under this proposal, the NFL teams had first refusal rights and compensation rights
over their veteran players whose contracts had expired. The court
held that a per se rule of illegality could not be applied because
binding precedent required that a rule of reason, which forces the
court to balance the proposals' anti-competitive effects with its
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol9/iss2/21
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pro-competitive effects, must be applied.'
-E.A.
No. 90-1071 (RCL) U.S. DIST.
SEPT. 10, 1992).
18094
(D.D.C.
LEXIS

BROWN V. PRO FOOTBALL, INC.,

Professional football players who played on Developmental
Squads for the National Football League (NFL) teams during the
1989 season brought a class action against the 28 individual NFL
teams and the NFL itself.
The use of Developmental Squads was a new concept which
permitted NFL teams to sign rookie and first-year free agents to
personal services contracts for the season. The NFL Constitution
was amended to include Resolution G-2, provided that certain
players placed on reserve/injured status could not practice and
that others could, but would count against each Club's limit of six
Developmental Squad players (maximum of 47 players per team).
Those players on Developmental Squads were to be treated equally
with players on the Reserve/Injured list and players on the Inactive list. Under the NFL Constitution and Bylaws, players on the
Reserve/Injured list are compensated at the full rate of their NFL
Players Contracts. Under Resolution G-2, Developmental Squad
players would be paid a fixed salary of $1,000 per week instead of
being permitted to negotiate their own salaries. Plaintiffs filed suit.
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, claiming that the
uniform wage provision of Resolution G-2 violates the Sherman
Antitrust Act, and that under the Clayton Act, they are entitled to
damages and attorney's fees. The NFL teams claimed that the antitrust laws do not apply to "wage-fixing restraints" imposed by
employer groups on employees. The U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia held that wage-fixing is an antitrust violation to
which the Sherman Act applies. The court determined that the
wage restraints, under these circumstances, were not subject to the
per se rule whereby there is no defense to the antitrust violation.
Rather, the court held that the "Rule of Reason" test applied, thus
permitting the NFL teams to defend the passage of the wage-restraint. Under this test, the court must balance the anti-competitive effects of the challenged restraint against its pro-competitive
effects. If anti-competitive effects outweigh pro-competitive effects,
the restraint is found to be unreasonable and violative of antitrust
1. Editor's note: A summary of the final outcome of the McNeil case will appear in
Volume 10 Number 1.
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